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FEDERAL COURTS - CRIMINAL LAW - SCOPE OF TERRY SEARCH
INCLUDES AUTOMOBILE PASSENGER COMPARTMENT - COURT WILL
FIND JURISDICTION DESPITE POSSIBLE STATE GROUND
Two police officers, observing a car swerve off a county road
and come to a stop in a ditch, stopped to investigate.' The officers
found David Long, the driver, outside the car and, after spotting a
hunting knife through the open car door, subjected him to a
patdown search for other weapons.2 They found no other weapon.3
Nevertheless, one of the officers shined his flashlight into the car
and retrieved an open pouch that was visible beneath the armrest.4
After inspecting the pouch's contents, the officers arrested Long for
possession of marijuana.5 The trial court denied Long's motion to
suppress the marijuana and convicted him of possession of
marijuana. 6  The Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed the
conviction.' The Michigan Supreme Court reversed the decision,
however, and held that the officers' search of the car was
1. Michigan v. Long, 103 S. Ct. 3469, 3473 (1983). The officers were on night patrol and began
to follow the car, which was speeding. Id.
2. Id. The United States Supreme Court previously approved a patdown search of a person for
weapons in the absence of either a search warrant or probable cause to arrest. See Terry v. Ohio, 392
U.S. 1(1968).
3. 103 S. Ct. at 3473.
4. Id. Long stood at the.rear of the car with Deputy Lewis while Deputy Howell conducted the
flashlight search for other weapons. Id. Deputy Howell entered the car only when the light partially
revealed a container under the armrest; he lifted the armrest to remove the container. Id.
5. Id. After arresting Long, the deputies opened the trunk of Long's car, which was closed but
missing its lock. Id. They found approximately 75 pounds of marijuana in the trunk. Id. The
contents of both the pouch and the trunk were admitted as evidence at trial. Id.
6. People v. Long, 94 Mich. App. 338, -, 288 N.W.2d 629, 630 (1979).
7. Id. at __ , 288 N.W.2d at 634. The Michigan Court of Appeals reasoned that the patdown
search of Long was reasonable because of the discovery of a large knife on the floor of the car. Id. at
-, 288 N.W.2d at 631-32.
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unreasonable and the evidence seized should have been
suppressed.8  The United States Supreme Court reversed the
Michigan Supreme Court9 and held that when officers conduct a
protective search for weapons on the reasonable belief that a
suspect may be armed, such a search may reasonably extend
beyond the suspect's person to the parts of the passenger
compartment in which a weapon might be hidden.' 0 Michigan v.
Long, 103 S.Ct. 3469 (1983).
A police officer's authority to subject an individual to a
"patdown" search for weapons is a limited, exception to the
requirement that an officer have probable cause to believe a crime
is being committed before he can invade an individual's privacy.II
The requirement of probable cause is itself an exception to the
prohibition against search or seizure without a particularized
warrant. 12 Commonly known as a Terry search, 13 its justification is
the need for law enforcement officers to protect themselves and
others from possible violence in the context of a limited
8. People v. Long, 413 Mich. 461, -, 320 N.W.2d 866, 870 (1982). The Michigan Supreme
Court ruled that both the fourth amendment to the United States Constitution and Article 1, § 11 of
the Michigan Constitution prohibited a search of the vehicle in Long. Id. at __ , 320 N.W.2d
at 869 & n.4. The circumstances deemed significant to the court's rationale were (1) the frisk of Long
revealed no weapons and (2) since Long was outside the car, any weapons hidden within the car were
outside his reach and thus posed no danger to the officers. Id. at -, 320 N.W. 2d at 869.
9. 103 S. Ct. at 3483.
10. Id. at 3480. The Court distinguished a protective search for weapons in this context from a
search incident to a custodial arrest, which involves a need to preserve evidence, and suggested that
its decision was not a blanket authorization to search the passenger compartment whenever a vehicle
was stopped for routine investigation. Id. n. 14.
11. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 25-26 (1968). The Supreme Court in Terry stated that without
probable cause to arrest, a search for weapons "must be limited to that which is necessary for the
discovery of weapons which might be used to harm the officer or others nearby." Id. at 26.
12. U.S. CONST. amend IV. The fourth amendment to the United States Constitution provides
as follows:
The right to the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and eflects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
Id.
The North Dakota Constitution contains a nearly identical provision. The text states:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated; and no warrant shall
issue but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, particularly
describing the place to be searched and the persons and things to be seized.
N.D. CONST. art. I, 5 8.
The history of exceptions to the warrant requirement has been extensively chronicled. See
generallyJ. HALL, SEARCH AND SEIZURE §§ 7:1-9:34 (1982 and Supp. 1983) (discusses the exceptions
for exigent circumstances, search incident to arrest, and search of a vehicle when probable cause
exists to believe criminal evidence is located therein).
13. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). The Terry Court reviewed the argument that a brief
investigative stop and frisk did not implicate fourth amendment concerns. Id. at 10-11 & n.5. The
Court concluded, however, that such activity did constitute a "search" and "seizure" within the
meaning of the Constitution. Id. at 16.
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investigation without probable cause to make an arrest. 14
Although the Terry doctrine arose out of a street
confrontation, 15 it frequently has been applied in the context of the
automobile stop. In Adams v. Williams16 a policeman reached
through an open car window and removed a gun from the
occupant's waistband.17 The Supreme Court ruled that the officer
acted justifiably on reasonable suspicion produced by a reliable
informant's tip.'8 In Almeida-Sanchez v. United States19 the Supreme
Court invalidated a stop and search conducted by the Border Patrol
without either probable cause or reasonable suspicion, even though
a federal statute authorized such searches. 20 The Terry principles
justified the search of a driver stopped for a traffic violation in
Pennsylvania v. Mimms. 2' The Supreme Court found that concerns
for the safety of the investigating officer justified the routine
practice of ordering traffic violators out of their cars. 22 Since no
question existed concerning the legality of the stop for a traffic
violation, the Court found no serious intrusion in the additional
requirement that the driver get out of his car during the normally
brief detention. 23
14. Id. at 24. The Supreme Court stated that it-would seem "clearly unreasonable" to prevent
an investigating officer from acting on ajustifiable belief that a suspect may be armed. Id.
15. Terry, 392 U.S. at 5. In Terry a police officer noticed two men on a downtown Cleveland
street and became suspicious when they took several turns walking past a store window and looking
inside, then meeting at the street corner to confer. Id. at 5-6. The police officer followed and
confronted them, identified himself, and "frisked" Terry when the men only mumbled in response
to his request for their names. Id. at 6. The officer felt a gun in Terry's overcoat and subsequently
recovered another gun from the second suspect. Id.
16. 407 U.S. 143, 145 (1972). In Adams a policeman was approached by an acquaintance who
pointed out a nearby car and said that the person seated inside had narcotics and a gun at his waist.
Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 144-45 (1972).
17. Id. at 145. The officer found the gun exactly as indicated by the informant. Id.
18. Id. at 146. The Court noted that the officer in Adams knew the informant personally, had
received reliable information from him in the past, and that the information in this case was
immediately verifiable. Id.
19. 413 U.S. 266 (1973). In Almeida-Sanchez Border Patrol officers stopped and searched a
Mexican citizen on a California highway about 25 miles north of the Mexican border. Almeida-
Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 267-68 (1973). He was convicted ofa marijuana offense as a
result of the patrol's search of his vehicle, from which a large quantity of the drug was recovered. Id.
at 267.
20. Id. at 268. The Court in Almeida-Sanchez recognized the Government's authority to conduct
routine warrantless searches at border checkpoints or their equivalent but refused to extend that
authority beyond these points in the absence of probable cause or consent. Id. at 272-73. See 8 U.S.C.
S 1357 (a) (3) (1982) (allows border patrol searches without a warrant).
21. 434 U.S. 106, 111-12 (1977). In Mimms the halting officer stopped Mimms to issue a citation
for driving with an expired license plate. Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 107 (1977). The
officer asked Mimms to get out of the car and produce his driver's license and registration. Id.
Noticing a bulge under Mimms' jacket, the officer suspected a weapon; the resulting frisk produced a
loaded gun. Id. Mimms was then arrested for carrying a concealed weapon. Id.
22. Id, at 110. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court reversed Mimms' conviction because the event
leading to the discovery of the weapon - the order to get out of the car - was not supported by
reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. Id. at 107-08.
23. Id. at 111. The Supreme Court stated, "What is at most a mere inconvenience cannot
prevail when balanced against legitimate concern for the officer's safety." Id. (footnote omitted).
The Court thereupon had no difficulty in concluding that the bulge in the driver's jacket justified the
patdown search for weapons. Id. at 112.
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The Supreme Court articulated the limits of a Terry seizure in
a different context in Dunaway v. New York. 24 In Dunaway the police
picked up a suspect for questioning regarding an attempted
robbery and homicide although the police did not have enough
information to request a warrant for his arrest.2 5 The interrogation
produced a confession, and Dunaway was convicted after the trial
court denied his motion to suppress his incriminating statements
and sketches. 26 The Supreme Court ruled that the detention for
interrogation was a "seizure" within the meaning of the fourth
amendment 27 and held that the seizure without probable cause to
arrest violated the defendant's constitutional rights. 21
In New York v. Belton,29 another automobile stop and search
case decided in the 1980 term, the Supreme Court approved a
police search of a zippered jacket pocket within the passenger
compartment although the car's occupants were then outside the
vehicle and the jacket was not within their reach.30 The Belton
Court relied on its interpretation of Chimel v. California3t in
concluding that the search was properly conducted incident to a
valid arrest. 32 The dissent in Belton charged that the Court had
24. 442 U.S. 200 (1979).
25. Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 203 (1979). In Dunaway a detective talked to a jail
inmate after an informant implicated the inmate along with someone named "Irving." Id. & n. 1.
The inmate denied involvement, but also referred to an "Irving" as someone who might have been
involved. Id. Based on those statements and the informant's identification of Dunaway's picture in a
police file, the police picked up the defendant, Irving Jerome Dunaway, and took him to the police
station for questioning. Id.
26. 442 U.S. at 203. The United States Supreme Court considered the case twice, first vacating
the judgment for reconsideration by the New York courts in light of Brown v. Illinois. See Brown v.
Illinois, 422 U.S. 590 (19Z5) (Miranda warnings did not per se cure violation of arrest without
probable cause). In Brown the county court on remand granted defendant's motion to suppress. Id. at
205-06. The New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division reversed and held that even if the
detention was illegal, attenuating circumstances overcame the illegality. Id. at 206. When the New
York Court of Appeals dismissed the defendant's appeal, the Supreme Court again granted
certiorari. Id.
27. Id. at 207. The State contended that "reasonable suspicion" was sufficient to support the
detention since no arrest had been made. Id.
28. Id. at 216. The Supreme Court reviewed Terry and cases following. Id. at 208-12. The Court
noted that "[b]ecause Terry involved an exception to the general rule requiring probable cause, this
Court has been careful to maintain its narrow scope." Id. at 210. The Court found that Dunaway's
detention was an arrest in all but name and went far beyond the limited intrusion based on
reasonable suspicion allowed by Terry. Id. at 212-13.
29. 453 U.S. 454 (1981). The initial stop in Belton was for a speeding violation. New York v.
Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 455 (1981). The scent of burnt marijuana led to the occupants' arrests for
unlawful possession of marijuana. Id. at 455-56.
30. Id. at 462-63. The search of a closed jacket pocket revealed cocaine; Belton was indicted for
criminal possession of a controlled substance and pleaded guilty to a lesser included offense after the
trial court denied his motion to suppress the cocaine taken from the jacket. Id. at 456. However, he
reserved his right to appeal the search and seizure. Id. The New York Court of Appeals reversed and
the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari. Id. at 456-57.
31. 395 U.S. 752 (1969). In Chime the defendant was arrested pursuant to a warrant, and was
later convicted in part on the support of evidence that the police obtained in a contemporaneous
search, over defendant's objections, of his entire house. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 753-54
(1969).
32. Belton, 453 U.S. at 460. The Chimel Court reversed the defendant's conviction because it
found the search unreasonable in scope. In so doing it enunciated the principle that a search incident
to arrest must be limited, in the absence of a particularized search warrant, to the arrestee's person
and the area within which he might obtain a weapon or evidence ofcrime. Chimel, 395 U.S. at 768.
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abandoned the underlying principles of Chimel: that a warrantless
search incident to arrest be limited to acts necessary to secure the
safety of the arresting officer and preserve evidence that the
arrestee could easily conceal or destroy. 33 The Supreme Court's
expansive treatment of the "search incident" exception in Belton
foreshadowed its decision in Michigan v. Long. 34
The Long Court analyzed Terry v. Ohio31 and declared that
Terry did not articulate the limits of a protective search for
weapons. 36 Therefore, a Terry search need not be limited to the
person of the suspect. 37 The Court then noted that it had applied
Terry to approve searches based only on reasonable suspicion in the
context of automobile stops.38 Part of the rationale underlying those
decisions, the Court stressed, was that automobile investigations
pose a great danger for police officers. 39
The Long Court next discussed its decision in Chimel v.
California40  and stated that the decision established the
reasonableness of searching the area within an arrestee's immediate
control when making a valid arrest.4 1 The Court noted, however,
that a workable definition of such an area for purposes of
automobile stops eluded the courts until New York v. Belton.4 2 The
Court explained that the Belton decision provided a general rule that
police arresting an occupant of an automobile may search the
passenger compartment and any container found therein.4 3 The
Court then extended the Belton rule to situations in which a police
officer possesses a reasonable suspicion "that the suspect is
dangerous and the suspect may gain immediate control of
weapons. '4 4 Applying the Belton rule to the facts of Long, the
33. Belton, 453 U.S. at 463-64 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan cited Terry for the
proposition that a valid fourth amendment search must be strictly limited according to the
circumstances justifying its initiation. Id. at 464. He criticized the Belton majority decision as a
substantial expansion of the search incident to arrest exception to the warrant requirement and noted
that since all the arrestees were outside the car, none of them could have reached thejackets that were
searched. Id. at 466.
34. 103 S. Ct. at 3480 & n.14.
35. See supra notes 11-15 and accompanying text for a discussion of Terry v. Ohio.
36. Long, 103 S. Ct. at 3479. The Court in Long quoted from the dissenting opinion by Chief
Justice Coleman of the Michigan Supreme Court who speculated that the search in Terry would have
been equally permissible if the defendant had carried, rather than worn, the searched overcoat. Id.
n.12.
37. 103 S. Ct. at 3479.
38. Id. See Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 107 (1977) (driver stopped for expired license
plate asked to get out of car; bulge sighted in jacket reasonably led to search for weapon); Adams v.
Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 146 (1972) (gun seized from person seated in car on basis of reliable tip).
39. Long, 103 S.Ct. at 3479.
40. Id. at 3480. See Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 768 (1969).
41. 103 S. Ct. at 3480. The Court stated that its holding in Chimel explicitly relied on Terry. Id.
42. Id. See New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 460(1981).
43. Long, 103 S.Ct. at 3480. The Belton Court's rationale was that if the passenger compartment
was generally within the arrestee's control for access to weapons or evidence, the same was true for
any container inside the passenger compartment. Belton, 453 U.S. at 460.
44. 103 S. Ct. at 3480 (footnote omitted). Noting that the Terry standard based reasonableness
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Supreme Court found that the nighttime hour and rural area, the
unresponsiveness of the driver, the knife on the car floor, and
Long's impending re-entry of the car to retrieve his registration
card all pointed to the reasonableness of the officers' taking
preventive measures to ensure the absence of any other weapons
within Long's reach.4 5
The dissenters in Long disputed the majority's conclusion that
Terry provided authority for the vehicle search.4 6 The dissent also
distinguished Chimel v. California and New York v. Belton as being
searches incident to lawful arrests and supported by probable
cause.4 7 In these cases, the dissent pointed out, the authority to
search stems from the lawful arrest, at which point an individual's
privacy interest is abated.4 8 As the dissent noted, however, Long
was not arrested until after the search of his vehicle.4 9 The dissent
accused the majority of perverse reasoning in validating the search
based on reasonable suspicion because no probable cause to arrest
existed 50
Thus, the United States Supreme Court has expanded the
Terry doctrine to allow the search of a passenger compartment and
seizure of contraband found in it on less than probable cause. The
investigating officer need only reasonably believe an occupant or
recent occupant of the automobile is dangerous and might gain
access to weapons. 51
on all the circumstances, the Court stated, "If a suspect is 'dangerous,' he is no less dangerous
simply because he is not arrested." Id. at 3481.
45. Id. The Court referred to Terry as authority for balancing the intrusiveness to the individual
against the need for the search, and concluded that the balance weighed in favor of searching a
passenger compartment if reason existed to believe the occupant was dangerous. Id. See Terry v.
Ohio, 392 U.S. 1,20-21 (1968).
46, 103 S. Ct. at 3483 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan argued that the "frisk"
authorized by Terry was narrowly limited to the suspect's outer clothing to discover any concealed
weapons. Id. at 3484. Justice Brennan also questioned the Court's reliance on Mimnu and Adams and
noted that both cases involved searches of the person only. Id. n.2.
47. Id. at 3484-85. Justice Brennan quoted extensively from the Terry Court's distinction
between a search incident to arrest and a protective "frisk" for weapons. Id. at 3485. The quoted
passage states in part:
An arrest is a wholly different kind of intrusion upon individual freedom from a
limited search for weapons, and the interests each is designed to serve are likewise
quite different. An arrest is the initial stage of a criminal prosecution. It is intended to
vindicate society's interest in having its laws obeyed, and it is inevitably accompanied
by future interference with the individual's freedom of movement, whether or not trial
or conviction ultimately follows. The protective search for weapons, on the other
hand, constitutes a brief, though far from inconsiderable, intrusion upon the sanctity
of the person.
Id. (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 26 (1968)) (footnote omitted).
48. 103 S. Ct. at 3485 (Brennan,J., dissenting). See, e.g., United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S.
218, 234 (1973) (Terry standards for search stricter than those governing search incident to lawful
arrest).
49. 103 S. Ct. at 3485 n.4 (Brennan,.J., dissenting).
50. Id. at 3487.
51. Id. at 3480. The Court emphasized that it did not view its decision as authorizing an
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To reach the search and seizure issue, the Long Court first
needed to resolve the contention that it lacked jurisdiction to review
the decision of the Michigan Supreme Court. 52 The Long Court
agreed that its jurisdiction would fail if the state court decision
rested on adequate and independent state grounds. 53 The Court
reviewed and then discarded its prior "ad hoc method" of dealing
with state court decisions involving mixed state and federal
grounds.54 The Supreme Court announced a new rule: when a
state court decision appears to rely on federal grounds, "and when
the adequacy and independence of any possible state law ground is
not clear from the face of the opinion," the Supreme Court will
conclude that the federal ground was necessary to the decision and
will find jurisdiction to review. 55
The Long Court recognized that the history of the United
States Supreme Court's approach to review of ambiguous state
court decisions is somewhat inconsistent. 56 In Lynch v. New York57
the Supreme Court denied review because the record did not
affirmatively show 58 that the state court had based its decision on
federal constitutional grounds. 59 Similarly, the Supreme Court
refused to review a federal question in Minnesota v. National Tea
Co. 60 because it was uncertain whether the decision of the
automobile search during every investigative stop, but only when officers "have the level of suspicion
identified in Terry." Id. n.14.
52. Id. at 3474. The defendant argued that the Michigan Supreme Court relied on the state
constitution, which supplied an adequate and independent state ground and thus precluded the
United States Supreme Court's exercise ofjurisdiction. Id.
53. Id. at 3476. Section 1257 of Title 28 of the United States Code authorizes the United
States Supreme Court to review state court decisions. See 28 U.S.C. S 1257 (1976). This grant of
jurisdiction rests on the presence of a "federal question." See generally C. WRIGHT, THE LAW OF
FEDERAL COURTS 5 107 (4th ed. 1983) (reviews the history of federal jurisdiction over the state courts
and notes criteria for determining existence of substantial federal question and whether adequate
state ground for decision bars review by federal courts).
54. 103 S. Ct. at 3474-76. The Court stated that doctrinal consistency is necessary with respect
to "sensitive issues of federal-state relations." Id. at 3475.
55. Id. at 3476. The Supreme Court stated that its decision in Long was motivated by its respect
for the independence of state courts and its desire to avoid advisory opinions. Id. at 3475-76.
56. Id. at 3474. Compare Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 652 (1979) (even if adequate state
ground existed, Supreme Court took jurisdiction on finding that Delaware Supreme Court did not
intend state ground to be independent) with Durley v. Mayo, 351 U.S. 277, 281 (1956) (Supreme
Court would not take jurisdiction if state court decision might have been based on independent state
ground).
57. 293 U.S. 52 (1934). Lynch involved an appeal by the New York State Tax Commissioner
from ajudgment annulling his determination that rental income from out-of-state property should be
considered for purposes of determining a resident's state income tax liability. Lynch v. New York,
293 U.S. 52, 53 (1934).
58. Id. at 54. The trial court in Lynch issued a brief opinion citing exlusively decisions of the
United States Supreme Court and related annotations. Pierson v. Lynch, 237 App. Div. 763, -,
263 N.Y.S. 259, 260 (1933). The Court of Appeals of New York affirmed in a memorandum
decision. People ex rel Pierson v. Lynch, 263 N.Y. 533, 189 N.E. 684 (1933).
59. 293 U.S. at 54. The Lynch Court noted that it could have been surmised that the state court
rested its decision on federal grounds, but that "jurisdiction cannot be founded upon surmise." Id.
60. 309 U.S. 551 (1940). The Minnesota Supreme Court had affirmed lower court judgments
granting refunds of a gross sales tax imposed by the state on chain stores. Minnesota v. National Tea
Co., 309 U.S. 551, 552 (1940).
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Minnesota Supreme Court rested on state or federal grounds. 61
Instead of dismissing the writ as in Lynch, however, the National Tea
Court vacated the decision and remanded the case so the state court
could more explicitly state the basis for its decision. 62
Sixteen years after National Tea, the Court dismissed a state
prisoner's petition for habeas corpus in Durley v. Mayo63 because of
the possibility that the state court decision was based on an
adequate state ground.64 Although the Florida Supreme Court's
decision was filed without an opinion, 65 on oral argument in the
United States Supreme Court the State argued that the decision
could have rested on adequate state grounds. 66 The dissenters in
Durley argued that the Florida courts had not rigidly applied the
state bar raised in that case 67 and further, that the claims below
clearly had been dismissed on their merits. 68 For those reasons, the
dissent would have taken jurisdiction over the federal claims. 69
In recent cases the Supreme Court has more readily accepted
jurisdiction to review ambiguous state court decisions. 70  In
Delaware v. Prouse7' the Court made an independent determination
that "the Delaware Supreme Court did not intend to rest its
decision independently on the State Constitution and that we have
jurisdiction of this case." ' 72 The Court summarily rejected a
61. Id. at 554-55. The Court noted that the Minnesota court referred to both state and federal
constitutions, but it appeared to rely on federal court interpretations of the fourteenth amendment.
Id.
62. Id. at 557. On remand, the Minnesota Supreme Court reinstated the judgments in a brief
opinion stating that the state constitution compelled its decision. National Tea Co. v. State, 208
Minn. 607, __, 294 N.W. 230, 231 (1940).
63. 351 U.S. 277 (1956). In Durley v. Mayo Durley had been sentenced to 30 years in prison for
stealing cattle. Durley v. Mayo, 351 U.S. 277, 278 (1956). On appeal he claimed violations of the
fifth and fourteenth amendments. Id. at 279.
64. Id. at 278. A Florida circuit court had quashed Durley's petition for a writ of habeas corpus
and the Supreme Court of Florida dismissed his appeal without filing an opinion. Id. at 279.
65. Id. The Florida Supreme Court also denied a second petition of Durley without opinion
three years later. The Supreme Court subsequently granted certiorari. Id. at 280.
66. Id. The Court placed the burden of establishing jurisdiction on the petitioner, stating that he
"must demonstrate that neither of these state grounds can account for the decision below." Id. at
281.
67.'351 U.S. at 290 (Douglas, J., dissenting). The State contended that the issues raised were
res judicata. Id. at 280. Justice Douglas noted, however, that the Florida Supreme Court itself had
refused to apply that doctrine "where to do so would 'defeat the ends of justice.' " Id. at 290
(quoting Universal Const. Co. v. -City of Ft. Lauderdale, 68 So. 2d 366, 369 (Fla. 1953)) (footnote
omitted).
68. 351 U.S. at 290 (Douglas,J., dissen'ting).
69. Id. at 291.
70. See Cameron, Federal Review, Finality of State Court Decisions, and a Proposalfor a National Court of
Appeals - A State Judge's Solution to a Continuing Problem. 1981 B.Y.U.L. REV. 545, 558 (1981). The
commentator notes that some form of federal review of state court decisions is essential and state
judicial systems would ultimately benefit from creation of a National Court of State Appeals that
would review decisions of the highest state courts in which federal questions were raised and state
remedies have been exhausted. Id.
71. 440 U.S. 648 (1979). Prouse involved a state appeal from the Delaware Supreme Court's
judgment that random stops of motorists without reason to suspect any violation of the law were
unconstitutional. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 651-52 (1979).
72. Id. at 652. The Delaware Supreme Court had found violations of the fourth and fourteenth
amendments to the United States Constitution and Art. I, § 6 of the Delaware Constitution. Id. at
651-52.
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challenge to its jurisdiction in Oregon v. Kennedy73 and noted that the
Oregon court had relied on decisions of the United States Supreme
Court with only one exception. 7 4 The Supreme Court affirmed the
decision of the Delaware court,75 but reversed the Oregon court7 6
and found that it had taken an "overly expansive view of the
application of the Double Jeopardy Clause." 77
The Long Court found unacceptable all its prior approaches to
determining whether a state court judgment was based on adequate
and independent state grounds. 78 The new rule, the Court stated, is
grounded in respect for the independence of state courts. 79 A state
court can maintain its independence by making "a plain statement
in its judgment or opinion that the federal cases are being used only
for the purpose of guidance, and do not themselves compel the
result that the court has reached. "80
Justice Blackmun did not join the part of the opinion that
stated the new jurisdictional rule, 81 and Justice Stevens filed a
dissenting opinion. 82 Justice Stevens characterized the Court's
approach as an abandonment of the historical presumption that
adequate state grounds are independent unless it clearly appears
73. 456 U.S. 667 (1982). In Kennedy the Oregon Court of Appeals held that the State's retrial of
the defendant after a mistrial constituted double jeopardy, and the United States Supreme Court
reversed. Oregon v. Kennedy, 456 U.S. 667, 669-70 (1982).
74. Id. at 671. In taking jurisdiction, the Court stated, "Even if the case admitted of more doubt
as to whether federal and state grounds for decision were intermixed, the fact that the state court
relied to the extent it did on federal grounds requires us to reach the merits." Id. (citation omitted).
See also South Dakota v. Neville, 103 S. Ct. 916, 919 n.5 (1983) (recognizes that South Dakota court's
decision rested on adequate state ground, but concludes that South Dakota Constitution had not
provided independent state ground).
75. Prouse, 440 U.S. at 663. The Court stated that it granted certiorari in Prouse to resolve a
conflict among various jurisdictions. Id. at 651 (citation and footnotes omitted).
76. Kennedy, 456 U.S. at 669.
77. Id. Justice Brennan noted that nothing in the Court's opinion would prevent the state court
on remand from reinstating its judgment based on its interpretation of its own constitution. Id. at
680-81 (Brennan, J., concurring).
78. Long, 103 S. Ct. at 3475. In disapproving its historical approaches, the Court rejected
dismissal because it failed to satisfy the need for uniformity in federal law, rejected remand for
clarification because it led to delay and decreased efficiency ofjudicial administration, and rejected
independent examination because it required the Court to interpret unfamiliar state laws. Id.
79. Id. at 3475-76. A second basis of the new rule is the Court's desire to avoid rendering
advisory opinions. Id. The Supreme Court has interpreted the constitutional assignment of federal
court jurisdiction to "cases" and "controversies" as forbidding advisory opinions. E.g., Preiser v.
Newkirk, 422 U.S. 395, 402, 404 (1975) (when reason for prisoner's petition removed before district
court action, no present controversy existed and complaint should have been dismissed). See U.S.
CONST. art. III, S 2 (judicial power extends to controversies between states or citizens of different
states).
80. 103 S. Ct. at 3476. The Court explained that a "plain statement" of state grounds would
avoid federal court intrusions into state law. Id. The Court, however, warned that when
"clarification is necessary or desirable, [the Court] will not be foreclosed from taking the appropriate
action." Id. n.6.
81. Id. at 3483 (Blackmun, J., concurring). Justice Blackmun suggested that the new approach
posed an increased danger of the Court issuing advisory opinions. Id.
82. Id. at 3489-92 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens' dissent in Long focused solely on the
jurisdiction question. Id.
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otherwise.1 3 In his view, the dictates of federalism and judicial
efficiency militate against review by the United States Supreme
Court of state court decisions with ambiguous grounds.8
4
Justice Stevens advanced the "novel view," in the words of
the majority, 5 that the Court should usually refrain from review in
cases in which a state complains "that the state court interpreted
federal rights too broadly and 'overprotected' the citizen.' '86
Drawing an analogy between a sovereign state and a foreign
country, Justice Stevens suggested that the United States would
have reason to intervene in internal affairs only if an American
citizen were deprived of some basic right 87 He noted that the need
for uniformity in federal law was present whether or not a state
court decision was based on adequate and independent state
grounds.88 However, he contended, unless the Court's intervention
would change the state court decision, the Court should not
interfere.8 9
The Long Court's extension of the Terry doctrine should
surprise no one who has followed the gradual erosion of the
exclusionary rule. 90 The question after Long, then, is what will
83. Id. at 3489. Justice Stevens reasoned that if the Court rejected the "intermediate
approaches" of vacation and remand or independently assessing state law, stare decisis demanded a
return to the restraint evidenced by Lynch. Id. at 3489-90.
84. Id. at 3490. Justice Stevens' counsel for restraint in Long has some support in prior United
States Supreme Court decisions. See, e.g., Rescue Army v. Municipal Court, 331 U.S. 549, 569
(1947) (Court has avoided passing on many constitutional questions within its jurisdiction unless
such decisions are unavoidable, that is, the record presents no other ground on which the case may
be resolved).
85. 103 S. Ct. at 3477 n.8.
86. Id. at 3490 (Stevens, J., dissenting). In support of his view, Justice Stevens cited a decision
that stated the Supreme Court had a duty to review state court decisions " 'where a Federal right
has been denied.' "Id. at 3491 (quoting Creswill v. Knights of Pythias, 225 U.S. 246, 261 (1912)).
87. 103 S. Ct. at 3490. In the present case, Justice Stevens pointed out, "[t]he respondent is a
United States citizen as well as a Michigan citizen, but since there is no claim that he has been
mistreated by the State of Michigan, the final outcome of the state processes offended no federal
interest whatever." Id.
88. Id. at 3491-92.
89. Id. at 3492. Since the Long Court rejected the vacate and remand technique exemplified by
Minnesota v. National Tea Co., 309 U.S. 551 (1940), Justice Stevens suggested that the dissenting
opinion in National Tea should be applicable. He quoted from that opinion, which includes the
following language:
The fact that provisions of the state and federal constitutions may be similar or
even identical does not justify us in disturbing a judgment of a state court which
adequately rests upon its application of the provisions of its own constitution. That the
state court may be influenced by the reasoning of our opinions makes no difference
.... [Tihe judgment of the state court upon the application of its own constitution
remains ajudgment which we are without jurisdiction to review. ...
103 S. Ct. at 3492 n.4 (quoting Minnesota v. National Tea Co., 309 U.S. 551, 558-59 (1940)
(Hughes, C.J., dissenting)).
90. See Michigan v. Long, 103 S. Ct. 3469, 3483 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice
Brennan listed three related cases decided during the current term. He stated, "Plainly, the Court is
simply continuing the process of distorting Terry beyond recognition and forcing it into service as an
unlikely weapon against the Fourth Amendment's fundamental requirement that searches and
seizures be based on probable cause." Id. (citation omitted).
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suffice as a "plain statement" of reliance on state grounds within
"the four corners of the opinion." 91 If the decision forces state
courts to express more clearly the grounds of their decisions, such
clarity would no doubt benefit all who must interpret them. It
appears, however, that the Long decision also provides state courts
with an open invitation to evade federal review.9 2 While such a
course may foster efficiency of judicial administration, it is
arguable whether it will serve the objective of uniform
interpretation of federal law.
In the area of search and seizure alone, the North Dakota
Supreme Court routinely interprets the federal constitution. 93
Although the North Dakota Constitution contains a provision
nearly identical to the fourth amendment to the United States
Constitution, 94 the great wealth of federal cases gives state courts a
substantial source of references. Thus, it is not surprising that the
federal constitution is typically cited more frequently. 95 Whether
the Long decision will result in state courts placing more reliance on
interpretations of their own state statutes and constitutions is
uncertain. If not, the result may be to encourage states to appeal
more decisions of their own highest courts, 96 thus increasing the
workload of the United States Supreme Court.
NANCYJ. JAMISON
91. 103 S. Ct. at 3475-76.
92. Id. at 3476. Explaining how the need for federal review might be obviated, the Court stated:
"If the state court decision indicates clearly and expressly that it is alternatively based on bona fide
separate, adequate, and independent grounds, we, of course, will not undertake to review the
decision." Id.
93. E.g., State v. Anderson, 336 N.W.2d 634, 640 (N.D. 1983) (interpreted decision of United
States Supreme Court as allowing involuntary testing of blood only when suspect is already arrested;
thus, evidence derived from chemical testing without arrest must be suppressed); State v. Koskela,
329 N.W.2d 587, 590-92 (N.D. 1983) (affirmed robbery conviction on grounds that Terry and other
federal cases permitted initial stop of defendant and seizure of evidence in plain view of officers).
94. For the text of both state and federal constitutional provisions, see supra note 12.
95. In one recent advance sheet of the Northwestern Reporter, citations to the United States
Constitution occurred thirty-one times. 340 N.W.2d No. 3 at IX (Jan. 3, 1984). In contrast, the
seven states represented cited their own constitutions a total of nine times. Id. at IX-XIII.
96. See Michigan v. Long, 103 S. Ct. 3469, 3491 n.3 (1983) (Stevens J., dissenting). Justice
Stevens noted that the number of appeals by states from state court decisions heard by the Court had
increased from one in 1953 to thirteen in the 1982 term, and that states had filed at least 80 petitions
for certiorari during the latest term. Id.

